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Article: 
INTRODUCTION 
This article examines some of the major trends in social service contracting and what has been learned about it 
in the past 15 or 20 years. Enormous strides have been made in understanding alternative approaches to service 
delivery, as well as in realizing the key role played by the nonprofit sector in service delivery. Yet some 
perennial questions about the relationship between public and private sectors continue to plague us. 
 
Much has changed since this author wrote her dissertation in the late 1970s and early 1998s which then became 
a book on human services contracting (DeHoog, 1984). The scholarly literature on human services contracting 
or purchase of services (POS) was scant at that time, although practitioners and advocates of human services 
contracting had generally positive expectations for it (Kettner and Martin, 1993; Wedel et al., 1979) and there 
was a strong tradition of public-private cooperation in human services (Demone and Gibelman, 1989). 
 
The models of contracting from public choice scholars and other empirical works on the "hard services" (e.g., 
Savas. 1982) did not seem to fit the cases that the author examined in Michigan, i.e., social services under Title 
XX, the amendments to the Social Security Act and employment and training services under the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act. The economic or market model wherein government uses a competitive bidding 
process to choose among many service agents to obtain the most efficient and effective supplier seemed far 
removed from the reality of limited competition, political pressures, and organizational constraints. This model 
did not take into account the unique roles that nonprofit service providers played (and continue to play) in the 
human service contracting system. 
 
This article reviews some of the academic literature that has contributed to a more sophisticated understanding 
of contracting as well as some of the major trends and issues in social services contracting which are important 
to the changing relationships between the public and nonprofit sector. (While social service contracts sometimes 
are with for-profit and other public agencies, the largest and most interesting contracts are with nonprofits.) This 
article also offers some suggestions for how government and nonprofits do and can work together in delivering 
services by an awareness of each other's motives, problems, and concerns. In conclusion, some ideas are offered 
to stimulate future work on the subject. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Over the last two decades, scholars from a variety of different disciplines and approaches have contributed to 
our understanding of human services contracting. Early in the development of the literature, public choice 
economists (e.g., Bennett and Johnson, 1981; Savas, 1982, 1987) argued that human services could more 
efficiently and effectively be delivered by contract because of the benefits of competitive market forces, private 
efficiencies, greater personnel flexibility, and avoidance of public bureaucracies in much the way other types of 
public services (i.e., garbage collection) have been successfully contracted out. 
With generally less enthusiasm for the privatization alternative, political scientists and public 
administrationaists (e.g., Donahue, 1989; Ferris, 1986; Ferris and Graddy, 1986; Kettl, 1993; DeHoog, 1984) 
have tended to emphasize how government agencies make contracting choices, monitor service delivery, and 
deal with basic accountability failures. Scholars in schools of social work (e.g., Bernstein, 1991; Demone and 
Gibelman, 1989; Kramer, 1981; Kettner and Lawrence, 1986, 1993; Wedel et at, 1979) have usually focused on 
the purchase-of-service systems, service delivery problems, and the impact of contracting on the social agencies 
and their clients. 
 
Finally, a variety of economists and policy analysts (see, for example, O'Neill, 1989; Salamon, 1987, 1989; 
Weisbrod, 1988) have examined the contracting topic from the perspective of the nonprofit sector--its 
dependency on contracts, the competition among agencies, and the distinct characteristics of the sector and 
social agencies providing public services. The literature has certainly yielded some useful empirical 
information, a variety of perspectives, and a list of difficulties that may occur when government purchases 
social services. 
 
One of the clear messages from this literature has been to validate the distinction between human ("soft") 
services and other types, as well as emphasize the complexities involved in the service delivery system (Kettl, 
1993; Paulson, 1988; Savas, 1987). As Paulson (1988) argues, with mental health services as an example, 
"People and garbage are not the same." Those who have examined health services, veterans' affairs, professional 
services (e.g., medical) and others have shown that human services offer additional difficulties when 
government purchases them (Demone and Gibelman, 1989; Paulson, 1988; Schlesinger et al., 1986; Kettl, 
1993). Goals are often unclear, outcomes are difficult to measure, competition among private suppliers is often 
not desirable or useful, and the costs of monitoring services are frequently high. Service contracts typically are 
negotiated, not competitively bid, as they are for most other public services. 
 
The relationship established between the contractors and the government are critical in what Williamson (1984) 
has referred to "relational contracting." In addition, service coordination among various agencies (public and 
private) and continuity of providers are usually necessary. As a result, some (DeHoog, 1990; Paulson, 1988) 
have argued that a cooperative, rather than a competitive, approach is more appropriate in many of the social 
services. Thus, social services contracting is certainly an important area of contracting and privatization; yet, its 
unique characteristics mean that generalizations drawn from other services do not necessarily apply (Paulson, 
1988). 
 
Not only is social services contracting worth considering some-what separately from other services or products 
but the variety of services included under the general rubric of "social services" is also wide-ranging from the 
"harder," more easily defined services (e.g., transportation), to the "softer,'' more difficult services (e.g., family 
counseling) (Kettner and Martin, 1993). As a result, care must be taken to understand the many variables that 
affect the delivery of social services--for example, from the types of agents (individuals, nonprofits, for-profits, 
or public agencies) that provide them to the range of clients being served (e.g., low-income, elderly, ill, 
handicapped, etc.). Generalizations drawn from one type of service may not necessarily apply to others and 
exceptions to general trends are frequent. 
 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
The 1980s certainly provided many new contexts in-which to examine human services contracting and to 
experiment with alternative approaches to service delivery. The Reagan-Bush administrations and many state 
and local governments expanded contracting in an effort to seek fiscal relief, a reduced bureaucracy, and more 
effective services (DeHoog, 1984; Kettner and Martin, 1993). To what extent these goals were fully realized is 
still unclear, although single cases suggest mixed results (DeHoog, 1984; Drew, 1984; Schlesinger et at, 1986; 
Smith and Lipsky, 1993). It has been difficult to tease out the effect of the contracting mechanisms in isolation 
since many other social, political, and economic forces also affect service costs and outcomes. 
What can be said with some assurance is that the roles and relationships between governmental and nonprofit 
agencies have been changed and reevaluated as a result of increased contracting as well as other forms of 
partnership (Salamon, 1987). As Donald Kettl (1993:21) points out: 
 
First, government is relying on private partners to do public work. The growth of this trend has created a 
new kind of public management. Second, the practice of this new public management is scarcely 
uniform. Public-private partnerships produce highly variable relationships. The government often enters 
very different markets, deals with radically different organizations, and frequently receives surprisingly 
different results ... Third, government's role has changed. Government is less the producer of goods and 
services, and more the supervisor of proxies who do the actual work. 
 
As government agencies developed specific service contracts with outside organizations during the 1980s, they 
moved away from using a partnership or grant approach to encourage certain types of programs (Salmon, 1989). 
Whereas many organizations (state, local, and nonprofit) had been receiving funds from the federal government 
via categorical or block grants, as the federal government decentralized, cut or eliminated many programs, 
service contracts (as well as consumer vouchers) increasingly replaced the more open-ended grants as the 
mechanism of funding the service delivery. 
 
This approach, while certainly allowing for greater specificity and accountability, offered less flexibility for 
both parties to the contract agreement. On the government side, bureaucrats had to be much clearer and more 
specific in the request for proposals (RFPs) about client eligibility, service levels, quality expectations, and 
service methods. Once details were specified, the government could not fund services that deviated from the bid 
advertisement even if bidders offered appropriate and creative approaches to the service. For contractors these 
agreements typically required more reports, more paperwork, and changes in reimbursement mechanisms, such 
as per-unit service allocations for eligible clients (Bernstein, 1991). These requirements implied that the 
agencies had to change their policies, procedures, and personnel to adapt to these changing government 
expectations. 
 
City and county governments also engaged in greater scrutiny and reductions in discretionary funding of human 
services programs. Formerly, elected officials typically had provided lump sum allocations (sometimes called 
grants or subsidies) to many worthwhile nonprofit agencies in their communities. In some cases, these funds 
were eliminated entirely during budget cuts or, if they survived at all, were converted to specific purchase-of-
service contracts. Certainly scandals of agency mismanagement and even fraud contributed to the tightening of 
requirements and the reduction in funding in addition to the fiscal squeeze on local governments. Whatever the 
causes, the result was that general funding for agencies and programs was often replaced by funding for units of 
service for specific target populations to be performed in specified ways. 
 
TWO SIDES OF CONTRACTING EQUATION 
For the most part, nonprofit agencies are the suppliers of choice for most human services. This has meant added 
complexities for government agencies that purchase services. While nonprofits in general have certainly 
improved their management and fiscal capacities in recent years, many local nonprofits' are run by highly 
committed but inadequately trained executives. They may have strong political and public support in their 
communities and may have excellent professional reputations. Their expertise in producing desirable services 
and serving certain citizen groups offers strong inducement for state and local governments to contract with 
them. Nonetheless, they often struggle with basic administrative and accountability requirements imposed by 
the contracting government (Bernstein, 1991; Smith and Lipsky, 1993). Often they have not been able to 
afford the professional managers and staff (e.g., grantwriters, financial managers, program evaluators) to be 
able to ensure service and administrative compliance. Their traditional reliance on volunteers in service delivery 
has not always assisted them in providing continuous care for more indigent clients who are serviced by the 
government contracts (Smith and Lipsky, 1993). 
 
Of the three sectors (i.e., public, nonprofit, and for-profit), the nonprofit sector has been the fastest growing in 
terms of employees. The number of nonprofits has also expanded significantly during the 1970s and 1980s, 
approximately tripling the number of IRS designated, charitable organizations (Weisbrod, 1987). This growth 
drew a great deal of attention during the 1980s, especially since nonprofits have had to seek out new sources of 
revenues in the face of declining federal grants and contracts (Hodgkinson and Weitzman, 1986; Salamon, 
1987) as well as stiffer competition among nonprofits for donors and between the nonprofits and the business 
sector for fee-paying clients. 
 
Certainly the growth of human service nonprofits has been due in part to the growth and/or increasingly serious 
social problems. While some of these problems have been addressed with direct government action, many of 
them have been approached by a more fragmented combination of public and private efforts. The result is an 
often dizzying array of many different kinds of nonprofit agencies with unique histories, missions, services, and 
staffs. Many nonprofits were created within the last twenty years in response to government funding while 
others, primarily small, local agencies developed in response to unmet community needs (Smith and Lipsky, 
1993). The former type of agency may well have stronger administrative resources with which to obtain 
government contracts, but may be too dependent upon government funding to be able to withstand shifts in 
public priorities and funding (Ferris, 1993; Smith and Lipsky, 1993). 
 
Both government and the nonprofit sector have been affected-- probably fundamentally altered--by increased 
contracting, and not only in terms of their financial and management processes. The public sector—federal, 
state, county, and municipal agencies--cannot serve (and, of course, never has served) all the needs of its 
citizens, especially those who are poor and disadvantaged. On the other hand, private human service agencies 
cannot provide services for these needs without public financing and support. As a sector, they have not been 
able to raise sufficient private donations or fees to be able to pay the high costs of serving needy clients. 
 
In becoming interdependent, the buyer (government) and the seller (nonprofit agencies) have had to address 
fundamental questions about their basic functions and roles in service delivery. For government, the questions 
include: To what extent does government give up its governance role in exchange for merely a management 
role? How far should government go in ridding itself of service functions before it becomes a "hollow state?" 
What responsibilities cannot be delegated to private agencies (Kettl, 1993; Moe, 1987; Moskowitz, 1989)? 
 
For the nonprofits which largely supply social services the basic questions include: How dependent should a 
nonprofit agency be on government funding (Kramer and Grossman, 1987)? To what extent should the lure of 
public funding persuade nonprofits to alter their missions, goals, and accountability mechanisms (Demone and 
Gibelman, 1989)? How much should an agency exchange its voluntary character for a professional management 
culture often required by government? How committed are nonprofits to lobbying administrators and 
legislatures to continue the funding of key programs (Moskowitz, 1989)? To what extent does goal 
displacement occur when agencies exchange their emphasis on service missions to contract seeking and 
warding off competitors (Paulson, 1988)? Will nonprofits be more effective in their service delivery with 
increased government support (Bernstein, 1991; Kramer, 1987)? 
 
The tension between private independence and public control continues to be very much a part of the public-
private relationships in human services. Referring to this tension, Smith and Hague (1971) titled their book, The 
Dilemma of Accountability in Modern Government: Independence vs. Control, over twenty years ago. This 
same issue was more recently addressed by Ferris (1993) in his article. Our experience with social service 
contracting over the last decades has in no way resolved this tension. The increased number of public-private 
relationships mean that these issues must continue to be discussed in different contexts, perhaps with no real 
consensus among government managers, nonprofit professionals, and scholars. 
 
The blurring of the traditional boundaries between public and private sectors has quite likely created confusion 
about responsibility, ownership, and funding sources not only for those who work "in the system" but also for 
citizens and clients. Certainly the complexity, fragmentation, and blending of government and nonprofit 
structures and processes is cause for some concern regarding how social policy is developed, implemented, and 
evaluated in a democratic system. 
 
When many participants (including legislators) do not understand how public services are funded, operated, and 
monitored, it is difficult to hold one accountable for them. This is an area of study that has not yet been fully 
addressed in the literature but certainly bears further empirical examination. As Smith and Lipsky (1993:119) 
conclude: 
 
In essence, contracting with nonprofit agencies diffuses responsibility for public services. To be sure, 
public services are not always responsive to citizen complaints, but at the very least the locus of 
responsibility is clearer ... [Contracting] shifts the risk and responsibility of service delivery to the 
private agency and creates the nonprofit contract agency as a buffer between the citizenry and the state. 
 
LEARNING TO WORK TOGETHER 
The importance of partnerships between the public and private sectors to deliver social services leads to the 
question of what both sides need to learn and how they must adapt to these new relationships. While strong 
efforts in this direction have already been made, both sides of the contracting equation need to continue to 
improve their management training and skills, particularly in areas that involve interorganizational coordination 
and accountability systems. Both sides need to recognize that they operate in an interdependent, but dynamic, 
relationship. 
 
Government needs to understand better how the goals, resource constraints, and voluntary character of 
nonprofits make them different from public agencies. In doing so, however, government needs to be aware of 
the diversity of agency types and that each agency has unique cultures, histories, service mixes, and missions 
(Smith and Lipsky, 1993). Officials should realize that many agencies are largely dependent on government 
funding so that any changes in contract arrangements significantly affect these agencies. They should also be 
more aware of the desirability of service continuity for both the nonprofits and the clients (Paulson, 1988). In 
understanding the unique concerns of nonprofits, public officials may have to be more flexible in accountability 
and service delivery requirements, but only if the quality and effectiveness of the programs are maintained. In 
particular, government officials have to be more sensitive to the cash flow problems of nonprofits, which is a 
primary complaint from recipients of service contracts (Smith and Lipsky, 1993; Bernstein, 1991). 
 
Government managers of contracted services should also rethink their roles and training vis a vis nonprofit 
contractors. They should understand their role as boundary spanners more explicitly--i.e., reach out more 
effectively to nonprofit agencies through information exchange, cooperative planning, and service feedback. 
Their training should include negotiating, conflict resolution, monitoring, evaluation skills. They should be 
more aware of the advantages and disadvantages of using the three primary models of contracting--i.e., 
competitive bidding, negotiation, and cooperative partnership. In sum, they have to learn how to cope with the 
uncertainty and risks involved in social service contracting as well as how to reduce them (DeHoog, 1990; 
Kettl, 1993). 
 
On the other hand, nonprofits need to understand bureaucracy, government, and politics better. They need to 
know that government officials do not speak with one voice and may disagree about the need for contracting in 
general, and the use of certain services and agencies in particular (DeHoog, 1986). 
 
For the most part, the established, traditional nonprofits have developed professional staff and appropriate 
mechanisms to obtain and renew contracts; yet newcomers and community agencies still have to overcome 
some basic obstacles (Smith and Lipsky, 1993). By now most understand that they will not be rewarded with a 
contract simply for doing good but for doing good effectively, efficiently, and responsively. Nonetheless, some 
nonprofits must learn how better to demonstrate these qualities for public officials concerned with the process 
as well as the outcomes. Unfortunately, many smaller nonprofits operate so close to the margin that they have 
few resources to hire necessary staff and/or obtain the necessary training. Thus they often fail to employ middle 
managers or specialized staff with the appropriate management skills, legal expertise, and financial acumen 
necessary to survive over the long run in the contracting business. 
 
Contract writing, cost estimation, and negotiating skills are essential to obtain contracts in the first place. To 
continue receiving funds, nonprofits must develop accountability systems compatible with government 
requirements, including objective, systematic evaluation systems. Probably most important to success is to 
develop a diversity of funding sources and an entrepreneurial approach to seeking out new opportunities. Some 
nonprofits are quite skilled in scanning the political environment, sharing information, and developing creative 
programs that are responsive to changing social agendas. 
 
What are some specific ways in which these suggestions have been and can be realized? Several approaches 
have been used to improve communication and understanding between the two sectors. These include joint 
training programs and workshops, joint management contracts, strategic planning efforts, personnel exchanges 
or explicit hiring strategies to obtain staff members with experience in the other sector. Graduate education that 
broadens, rather than narrows, one's professional outlook is advisable--e.g., public administration programs 
encouraging their students to enroll in social work courses and vise versa. Contracting managers in both sectors 
should seek out other methods that will prepare their employees to work with their counterparts in other 
agencies. 
 
Seeing others in the system as allies, not adversaries, will go far to improve contracting management. The 
system itself may require adjustment. In some ways perhaps the impetus to increase competitive forces in 
contracting may have gone too far. In examining the impact of government contracting on the nonprofit or 
voluntary sector, Salamon (1989) argues that it no longer is a partner with government in serving clients. 
Rather, recent developments are moving the sector into the private market economy of competition in which 
nonprofits will be competing for clients and services among each other and against the private, for-profit sector. 
Whether or not one accepts this outlook, it is true that contracting, among other things, has changed the way 
nonprofits behave. Nonetheless, greater sensitivity on the part of government agencies to the needs and desires 
of nonprofits may soften some of the harsh realities that this competitive scenario implies. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The human services contracting system is increasingly complex and even troubling for many observers of 
recent trends. Contracting, however, is likely to become a permanent part of the social service delivery system. 
It will continue to offer advantages for government, nonprofits, and clients. 
 
We have learned a great deal about how to improve the contracting system and make it work fairly well. Our 
understanding of the relationships between public and private sectors has certainly improved over the last 
decade or more. Nonetheless, unanswered questions still remain about the appropriate balance between public 
and private service delivery and between public desires for accountability, efficiency, and cost controls, on the 
one hand, and private agencies' need for independence, creativity, and stability on the other. 
 
Scholars and practitioners can continue to contribute to our empirical base by examining exemplary cases of 
contracting systems, developing comparative studies of a range of contractual mechanisms to identify beneficial 
conditions, and focusing on the differential impacts of contracting on government, nonprofits, and clients. 
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